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Counter-discourses and the relationship between humans 
and other animals 
 
Arran Stibbe 
 
Abstract 
 
Several recent studies have critically analysed discourses involved in the oppression and 
exploitation of nonhuman animals, including those of the meat industry and zoos. This article turns 
the spotlight on counter-discourses, such as those of ecology and animal liberation, to ask if the 
alternatives they promote have the potential to contribute towards more harmonious relationships 
between humans and other animals. Despite their extreme importance in opposing oppressive 
discourses, the counter-discourses frequently share some of the basic assumptions of the discourses 
they criticise.  
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Introduction 
 
When we look back at the extraordinary progress humanity has made during the last 100 years, our 
satisfaction is inevitably marred by what has happened to the relationship between humans and 
other animals. While oppression and cruelty towards others may always have existed, the number of 
animals who have their lives ended or made miserable by human activity is now entirely 
unprecedented. In 2002, 10 billion birds and mammals were raised and killed in just one country, 
the United States, most of them confined ‘so tightly that they [were] unable to stretch their limbs or 
walk even a step or two’ (Singer 2003:3). It seems unlikely that people simply became more cruel 
as their countries developed; the explanation seems to lie more in the distance of the relationship 
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between an increasingly urban population, and nonhuman animals living out their lives far away 
behind locked doors.  
Donovan (1993:185) suggests that ‘We should not kill, eat, torture, and exploit animals 
because they do not want to be so treated, and we know that. If we listen, we can hear them.’ 
Listening, in this sense, necessitates a relationship of observation and empathy which is close 
enough to understand the fundamental needs of other animals. In the same way that humans have  
needs for protection, affection, participation and creation (Max-Neef 1992), nonhuman animals also 
have needs beyond the minimum for sustaining their lives. Learning to listen again is important not 
only for relieving the suffering of animals, but also for relieving the psychological damage that is 
occurring in technological societies as humans become isolated from each other, from other 
animals, and from nature (see Clinebell 1996, Rozak, Gomes, and Kanner 1995). In Shepard’s 
(1995:40)  view, ‘our profound love of animals’ has been ‘twisted into pets, zoos, decorations, and 
entertainment’, and needs to be re-found as part of the process of becoming fully human.   
But there is an equally pressing ecological reason why it is important to listen to other 
animals. In the optimal environment for animals - the natural environment to which they are 
adapted by their evolution - animals play an integrated role in maintaining balanced ecosystems. As 
Ekins, Hillman and Hutchinson (1992:50) point out, a natural system is ‘a totally renewable, no-
waste economy powered by the sun’; in other words, no inputs other than the sun’s energy are 
required and all ‘waste’ is used up by other processes. Compare this to the unnatural environments 
of intensive farms, where animals are deliberately prevented from living according to their nature. 
These farms suck in (and waste) huge amounts of grain and other foodstuffs, and disgorge 
environmentally damaging waste. Other ways of going against animals’ nature include destroying 
or fragmenting their habitats, selectively killing large numbers of specific species, forcing animals 
to adapt to monoculture environments, and introducing species to alien environments, all of which 
can damage the ecosystems on which life depends (see Miller 2002).  
As Capra (1997) shows, making human systems as close as possible to natural systems can 
have beneficial consequences for humans, other animals and all life. Such systems can only be 
created by ‘following the examples in the natural world, rather than always seeking to improve on 
or second guess them’ (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchinson 1992:50), which entails creating 
relationships with other animals in which it is possible empathise with and understand, rather than 
violate, their natures.  
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Relationships among humans are partially constructed through language; for example, the 
existence and use of insulting and offensive epithets does not merely reflect relationships of hate, 
the words themselves are the building blocks of such relationships. The importance of language lies 
in the way that, as Halliday (2001:179) describes, ‘our ‘reality’ is not something readymade and 
waiting to be meant - it has to be actively construed; and…language evolved in the process of, and 
as the agency of, its construal’.  
The relationship between humans and other animals is, therefore, partially constructed by 
the language used to talk to and about them. Some people, for instance, patronise and command  
pets in speech, establishing relationships of domination; and the names of animals are frequently 
spoken as insults (dog, pig, snake etc). There have recently been a number of detailed studies of 
specialist discourses: those of the animal product industries, pharmaceutical industries, zoos, 
hunting and circuses (including Stibbe 2003, 2001 and Dunayer 2001). The studies reveal how, 
within these discourses, metaphors, grammatical constructions, pronouns and other linguistic 
features portray nonhuman animals as objects, machines, or inferior beings, and so contribute to the 
moral licensing of otherwise unconscionable levels of cruelty to nonhuman animals.  In addition, 
economic discourses traditionally ignore altogether the impact of economic activity on nonhuman 
animals and their natural environments, constructing both as resources and raw materials which 
exist solely for human consumption. 
In opposition to oppressive discourses such as these, influential counter-discourses have 
arisen, including a great variety related to animal liberation, animal rights, ecology and the 
environmental movement. An important question is whether these counter-discourses promote and 
enable the construction of human-animal relationships in more harmonious ways. For all the 
reasons suggested above, harmonious relationships can be defined as those in which humans respect 
other animals, listen to them, accept the validity of their realities, and allow them (as far as possible) 
to live according to their own natures (see Donovan 1993).  
There are, of course, many counter-discourses, and many strands within each. Far from 
being a complete review, therefore, the following sections focus on aspects of influential counter-
discourses which are particularly relevant to constructing relationships between humans and other 
animals.  
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Counter-discourses 
 
The discourse of ecology and ecological economics 
 
Through the metaphor of ‘ecosystem’, the discourse of ecology represents biological 
organisms (animals, plants and micro-organisms) as inter-dependent and sustained by interactions 
among themselves and with their physical environment. This opens the way to conceptualise more  
equitable relationships between humans and other animals, based on mutual dependence, symbiosis, 
and a non-hierarchical acceptance of all species, including humans, as co-inhabitants of larger 
ecosystems. In other words, the discourse of ecology could contribute to the ‘land ethic’ proposed 
by Leopold (1966:240): ‘In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of 
the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, 
and also respect for the community as such’.  
 However, as McNeill (2000:335) points out, ecologists in the past have tended to pretend 
that humans did not exist: ‘[r]ather than sully their science with the uncertainties of human affairs, 
they sought out pristine patches in which to monitor energy flows and population dynamics. 
Consequently they had no political, economic -or ecological- impact.’ And we could add, limited 
impact on improving relationships between human and other animals.  
Subsequent approaches to ecology, including human ecology and ecological economics, 
have attempted to include humans in the larger picture. However, there is still a reluctance among 
some strands of human ecology to use discourse which firmly places humans within ecosystems. 
For example, the Ecological Society of America (1997:4) writes that ‘Humanity obtains from 
natural ecosystems an array of ecosystem goods - organisms and their parts and products’. This kind 
of language facilitates a conceptualisation of ecosystems as existing separately from humans, 
almost like supermarkets where humans can take supplies from, rather than as systems where all life 
is mutually sustained. Ecosystems, and all the animals within, become treated as human resources, 
the following being a typical example: 
 
Ecosystems generate ecological resources and services that are crucial for human welfare…an 
ecosystem…consists of and sustains a unique array of biotic or ‘living’ components…many 
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of which also support human production or consumption...we refer to these as ecological 
resources (Barbier, Burgess and Folke 1994) 
 
This extract metaphorically constructs ‘ecosystems’ as machines for creating human resources, by 
combining the term ‘ecosystem’ with terms from the discourse of machines (‘array’ and 
‘components’). Nonhuman animals, in this case, are ‘biotic components’, of a machine generating 
recourses to fuel human consumption. This kind of discourse seems to have failed to break away 
from the assumption that nonhuman animals are resources for humans - the same assumption 
adopted by exploitative discourses.  
Daly and Farley’s textbook ‘Ecological Economics: principles and applications’ provides a 
particularly clear example of the portrayal of nonhuman animals as resources. In one section, Daly 
and Farley (2004:43) provide a quotation from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) which asserts, ‘the 
state of Earth’s natural ecosystems has declined by about 33 per cent over the last 30 years’. They 
then re-express this in their own terms: ‘this means that the capacity of natural capital…to supply 
life support services has declined by about 33%’ (Daly and Farley 2004:34). In re-construing the 
WWF statement using the discourse of economics, they fail to heed Ekins, Hillman and Hutchinson 
(1992:50) warning that ‘To refer to the Earth, including its wealth of living systems, as “ecological 
capital” is already to devalue it’.  
The problem lies in the extent to which Daly and Farley use the discourse of economics in 
making their case. Daly and Farley’s book is based on the important insight that ‘The economic 
system is a subsystem of the global ecosystem’ (Daly and Farley 2004:61). However, they use the 
discourse of economics to describe ecosystems as if ecosystems were merely a subset of the human 
economy, rather than the other way round. Consider these examples: 
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…the structural elements of an ecosystem are stocks of biotic and abiotic resources (minerals, 
water, trees, other plants and animals), which when combined together generate 
ecosystem…services (ibid:94)  
 
Intact ecosystems are funds that provide ecosystem services, while their structural 
components are stocks that provide a flow of raw materials (ibid:104)  
 
In this arrangement, the global ecosystem is represented as a partner in a global economic system 
designed to serve human needs. Nonhuman animals are constructed as providing goods to humans, 
and the ecosystems they live within are described as providing waste disposal services 
(‘...ecosystems process waste, render it harmless to humans…’ ibid:75). However, in return for their 
goods and services, nonhuman animals receive only toxins, confinement or death. There seems to 
be very little consideration of the ecological services humans must necessarily provide to others 
(including other animals) within the ecosystem in order for the ecosystem as a whole to survive.  
It is informative to ask ‘where are the nonhuman animals?’ in Daly and Farley’s discourse. 
Two quotations which are particularly revealing, are as follows: 
 
Waste has a direct impact on human well-being and further diminishes ecosystem function. 
(ibid 2004:109) 
 
First, accumulating toxins have direct negative effects on humans. Second, the toxins damage 
ecosystems and degrade the ecosystem services on which we depend. (ibid 2004:119) 
 
In both of these quotations, nonhuman animals are part of ‘ecosystem function’ or ‘ecosystem 
services’, but the negative effects of waste are considered only in relation to humans. Only 
occasionally are other species talked about as if they mattered for their own sake, in examples such 
as ‘Many fish species have dangerously high levels of mercury and other metals, which cause 
human birth defects and worse when consumed, not to mention their impacts on other species.’ 
(ibid 2004:120). 
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 There is no doubt that the discipline of ecological economics provides an important new 
direction for economists, encouraging them to include in their considerations the effects of 
economic activity on ecosystems, with great potential to oppose ecologically destructive  
discourses. However, in terms of reconstructing the relationship between humans and other animals, 
discourse along the lines of Daly and Farley (2004) fails to transcend the anthropocentric 
assumptions of oppressive economic discourses, which consider nonhuman animals only in terms of 
their use to humans. It is hard to imagine empathy with a ‘biotic component’, a ‘biotic resource’, a 
‘raw material’, or a piece of ‘natural capital’.   
 
The discourse of Deep Ecology 
 
The anthropocentrism existing in both oppressive discourses and in some counter-discourses, is 
directly opposed by the discourse of the deep ecology movement (Naess 1990, 1973, Devall and 
Sessions 1985). The deep ecology movement presents a biocentric view which has great potential to 
contribute to harmonious relationships between humans and other animals: 
 
The wellbeing and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in 
themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These are independent of the 
usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. (Devall and Sessions 1985:70) 
 
This is an important challenge, but it could be argued that the representation of ‘value’ as an 
objective attribute possessed by animals has the side-effect of cutting humans out of the scene. 
Usually, in order for someone or something to have value, there must be an active agent doing the 
valuing. In using the term ‘intrinsic value’, the agent is suppressed by the normalisation of the word 
‘value’. This appears to be intentional: 
 
The presence of inherent value in a natural object is independent of any awareness, interest, or 
appreciation of it by a conscious being. (Regan, quoted in Devall and Sessions 1985:71) 
 
The effect of this construal is a representation of value as something which exists outside of 
relationships. Intrinsic value is a quality for which nonhuman animals have little use in isolation 
from humans. Only when in contact with humans does it become literally ‘vital’ that they are 
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valued. In discourses which aim to promote closer relationships between humans and other animals, 
it seems necessary to bring back the human agent of the process of valuing: providing inspiration 
for humans to value (verb) other animals, rather than asserting that other animals have value (noun) 
or are valuable (adjective).   
 
The discourse of wildlife conservation 
 
Related to the discourse of ecology is the discourse of wildlife conservation, exemplified most 
publicly by the World Wildlife Fund. The discourse of the WWF is, on one hand, scientific, 
referring to nonhuman animals in abstract terms such as ‘species, subspecies, varieties and 
subpopulations’ (WWF 2004). The concentration is on types of animals rather than individuals:  
 
If current trends continue unabated, several cetacean species and many populations will be 
lost in the next few decades. (WWF 2004, emphasis added).   
 
Discourse conducted at the level of collective nouns has the side-effect of distracting attention away 
from direct relationships with individual animals: an individual can be seen, heard, and empathised 
with, but a ‘species’ cannot. The scientific abstractions of the discourse of conservation can, of 
course, play an important role in saving members of endangered species from extinction, but by 
definition, these animals are few and far between. If only ‘species’ are to be saved, then the 
discourse of conservation has nothing to say about confining, hurting or killing animals in ways 
which do not threaten the species as a whole. There is a degree of separation, therefore, between 
species conservation and developing relationships of respect with nonhuman animals in general.   
However, the discourse of the WWF has another side which attempts to create more direct 
empathy with animals. In the context of fund-raising, the WWF (2004) gives glowing descriptions 
of twelve endangered species (salmon, elephants, gorillas, turtles, pandas, pikas, polar bears, rhinos, 
snow leopards, tigers, whales and dolphins), including statements such as ‘The lovable and 
charismatic panda is one of the most popular animals in the world.’ (WWF 2004). The following 
list shows all the adjectives used to describe these twelve species: 
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largest, larger, plentiful, mighty, huge, powerful, endangered, numerous, widespread, 
wondrous, remarkable, loveable, charismatic, popular, small, shy, majestic, silver, 
anadromous  (WWF 2004) 
 
From this list, it can be seen that the criteria being used to encourage people to value other animals 
centre around (in order of frequency) large size, rarity, cuteness/charisma/popularity, power, and 
majesty. The only exception is the small, shy, pika - the 'canary in the coal mine' (WWF 2004) for 
global warming.  
The success of the WWF's fund-raising tells us that discourse of this kind does, indeed, 
encourage respect for other animals; but the criteria it uses establishes a hierarchy of animals, in 
which respect is reserved for the large and the rare. It by-passes  relationships between humans and 
the majority of animals - the kind of animals people are most likely to encounter face-to-face in 
their daily lives,  or influence through their purchases of animal products.  
 
The discourse of animal liberation 
 
The animal liberation movement, in contrast to wildlife conservation, focuses specifically on 
those animals who suffer most at the hands of humans - the ones whose relationships with humans 
consist of little more than exploitation and abuse. Animal liberation, at first, seems an ideal 
discourse to promote a radical change in human/other animal relationships, yet this discourse too 
has its limitations. Tester (1991:196) sums up one limitation by claiming that within the animal 
liberation movement ‘The animals are nothing more than objects to which something is done.’ This 
claim can be substantiated through critical discourse analysis of animal liberation texts (see 
Fairclough 2003). 
While there are, of course, many different kinds of texts related to animal liberation, Peter 
Singer (2003, 1990, 1985) has been extremely influential, and his work provides a prototypical 
example of at least one major thread in the broader discourse of animal liberation. It is useful to 
analyse Singer (1985) in some detail, because it provides a summary of the philosophy of the 
Animal Liberation Movement using a form of discourse which is widespread within the movement. 
The summary contains statements such as:  
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Why do we lock up chimpanzees in appalling primate research centres…yet would never 
think of doing the same to a retarded human being at a much lower mental level? The only 
possible answer is that the chimpanzee, no matter how bright, is not human, while the 
retarded human, no matter how dull, is. This is speciesism…(Singer 1985: 6) 
 
This extract presupposes a form of interaction in which people use a moral calculus to decide how 
to treat nonhuman animals according to how they would treat humans. In terms of relationships, this 
implies conceptualising nonhuman animals in human terms rather than treating animals with respect 
for who they are. Singer makes an important moral point, but the discourse it is made in seems to be 
more about humans than about nonhuman animals. Within the summary there are 246 references to 
humans compared to only 96 references to other animals. And when nonhuman animals are 
mentioned, they are usually (89% of the time) referred to in the abstract (e.g., ‘animals’, ‘those not 
of our species’ or ‘other creatures’).  
As represented in Singer’s summary, animals have very little agency in their own affairs. 
Tester’s claim that nonhuman animals are represented in animal liberation discourse as nothing 
more than objects to which something is done, is partially born out by the grammatical 
constructions used. There are 20 cases in the summary where animals appear as grammatical 
objects, mostly as the affected participants of material processes (actions, deeds) carried out by 
human agents (see Halliday 2004; Goatly 2000). And as expected, these material processes 
frequently involve abuse: the human agent treats animals cruelly, deprives pigs of room, poisons 
rats, locks up chimpanzees, confines cows, uses nonhuman animals, experiments on monkeys, 
captures wild animals, takes the life of a fish, kills a fish, etc.   
Equally often (in 20 cases) nonhuman animals appear as grammatical subjects. The 
difference, however, is that when nonhuman animals play the role of subject, none of the processes 
they undertake are material processes. Instead, animals have rights, animals were property, other 
creatures have interests, the chimpanzee is not human, cows like lush pastures, nonhuman animals 
suffer, fish do not have a clear conception of themselves. These processes are relational, existential 
and mental, although the mental processes of animals are illuminated only in so far as they ‘suffer’, 
or negatively, in terms of not possessing a ‘clear conception’.  
Where are the nonhuman animals in the discourse of animal liberation? Buried in generic 
terms, grammatically realised as objects, or the subjects of non-material processes, and often 
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embedded in complements or adjuncts. This represents the grim reality of intensive farming, where 
animals are denied agency and are pushed out of mind as far as possible. The animal liberation 
movement strongly resists this treatment of animals, but does not necessarily provide a vision of 
more harmonious relationships, or a discourse which could help create these relationships.  
 
The discourse of animal rights 
 
The discourse of animal rights has much in common with that of animal liberation, but explicitly 
calls for legal rights to be established for certain nonhuman species of animals. An important role of 
animal rights discourse is in countering one of the main assumptions of oppressive discourses: that 
humans are superior to all other species because of the uniqueness of their intellect, language 
ability, self-conception, or other arbitrary characteristics. To counteract belief in the uniqueness of 
humans, statements such as the following frequently appear in the discourse of animal rights: 
 
they [animals] practice agriculture…ants construct special chambers containing fungus and 
bring leaves to nourish it…animals can make tools: chimpanzees shape sticks…bees convey 
information about the…quality of nectar…animals possess…the power to deceive others! 
Plovers will feign a broken wing to lead predators away…chimps can negotiate mazes…great 
apes possess the ability to learn and to express thought in human forms of discourse…(Gold 
1995: 29-30) 
 
Unlike much of the discourse of animal liberation, animals are represented here as active 
participants - as agents of material processes. The material processes in which the animals are 
engaged, however, are the kinds of activities to which humans are naturally suited, to a much 
greater extent than other animals.  
Discourse such as this is based on an assumption which is the same as that of the oppressive 
discourses it is countering: that superiority lies in the ability to perform arbitrary tasks such as 
speaking, solving intellectual puzzles, or making tools. While the attempt is clearly to show that 
humans are not unique, this form of discourse perpetuates the biased criteria that oppressive 
discourse gives for judging superiority, while still rendering animals inferior because of their lesser 
ability to perform these tasks. Chimpanzees’ may be able to make tools, but if this is the criteria for 
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judging superiority then humans will still be superior since their tools (e.g., fighter planes) are more 
sophisticated.  
If the assumption that animals should be judged in terms of their (minimal) ability to mimic 
humans is rejected, people may learn to listen to other animals, and appreciate them for the way 
they perform the tasks for which they are naturally suited. Some animals are expert at searching for 
warm air currents to soar effortless in the sky, others create a social map through surrounding 
smells, others are skilled in finding their way in a pathless jungles, and nearly all nonhuman animals 
are masters of living ecologically.  
The essence of animal rights discourse is that it is illogical to cause suffering to nonhuman 
animals because there are no relevant differences between humans and (at least some) other animals 
which could justify the difference in treatment. However, the emphasis on logic has been criticised 
for being excessively rationalist (Donovon 1993: 168). Indeed, Regan’s (1985) The case for animal 
rights attempts to create distance from emotion and sentiment, despite the fact that these (rather 
than logic alone) form the basic building blocks of good relationships, as well as the motivation to 
work towards more harmonious relationships. Regan writes that:  
 
And since…we must recognise our equal inherent value as individuals, reason - not 
sentiment, not emotion - reason compels us to recognise the equal inherent value of these 
animals and, with this, their equal right to be treated with respect (Regan 1985: 24) 
 
This exhibits what Donovan (1993:168) calls an ‘inherent bias in contemporary animal rights theory 
towards rationalism, which, paradoxically, in the form of Cartesian objectivism, established a major 
theoretical justification for animal abuse.’ In this way, animal rights discourse uses some of the 
same tools as oppressive discourses, but for diametrically opposite ends. By focusing attention 
away from ‘emotion’, the discourse of animal rights has the potential to discourage sensitivity 
towards and understanding of the emotions of nonhuman animals.   
The rationalist approach also makes animal rights discourse susceptible to counter-attacks 
which attempt to dismiss the whole foundation of the movement by mimicking and disrupting its 
basic logic. For example, Lomborg (2001), who sets out to show that the state of the world is 
improving, has a vested interest in ignoring the ever-increasing suffering of nonhuman animals. He 
uses the same logical discourse as animals rights, but with the opposite goal, of excusing his 
exclusion of nonhuman animals in his assessment of the state of the world: 
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while some…people will definitely choose to value animals and plants very highly, these 
plants and animals cannot to any great extent be given particular rights…Should penguins 
have the right to vote?...If we use the inalienable rights argument we could not explain why 
we choose to save some animals at the bottom of the sea while at the same time we slaughter 
cattle for beef. (Lomborg 12) 
 
This treats nonhuman animals as tokens or categories, rather than sentient beings, to be manipulated 
for the sake of making a logical point, and the discourse of animal rights is very susceptible to 
attacks of this type.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Looking at the extensive research available on other oppressive discourses, such as those of sexism, 
racism, and ableist discourse, there is a clear pattern to the way exploitative discourses are resisted. 
When enough attention is focused on the oppressive nature of a particular discourse, a counter-
discourse arises and is adopted with enthusiasm by activists. At first, the counter-discourse appears 
to offer the path to liberation, but gradually it becomes clear that it does not completely break away 
from the assumptions of the oppressive discourse, or provide a complete solution. An example is 
the highly oppressive medical model of disability, which was vigorously resisted with a new 
discourse (the 'social model'), in ways which had huge benefits for the disabled population. The 
social model was the main focus of disability activists for a long time before its limitations were 
exposed and researchers started looking in new directions, but never backwards towards the 
oppressive medical model (Crow 1996).  
Discourses of oppression have a built in resilience through their employment of categorical 
and rationalist phraseology which gives the sub-message that ‘This is the one-and-only possible 
Truth’. To oppose such discourses, counter-discourses often make use the same kind of 
authoritarian presentation since this style is more likely to be published and prove influential. The 
problem is that if and when counter-discourses succeed, they too become resilient, and it becomes 
difficult to transcend them with new discourses which address their shortcomings. Singer’s 
discourse, for example, has changed little in 30 years (see Singer 2003), and still has a central place 
in the animal liberation movement. In fact, all the counter-discourses described above follow 
resilient ways of writing to greater or lesser extents. For instance: 
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What’s wrong - fundamentally wrong - isn’t the details that vary from case to case…what’s 
wrong isn’t the pain, the suffering…These compound what’s wrong…But they are not the 
fundamental wrong.  The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as 
our resources…(Regan 1985:3) 
 
This extract uses categorical assertions of fact, with no hedging of the kind ‘one way to think about 
this’, or ‘potentially’, or ‘from one perspective’ (see Fairclough 2003:41). This way of writing 
poses a strong challenge to the oppressive discourse, but it closes down the space for alternative 
discourses to challenge the assumptions of the writer. For example, the use of the expression ‘the 
fundamental wrong’ rather than ‘a fundamental wrong’ is not open to the possibility that other 
discourses in the future may describe other fundamental wrongs.  
New discourses will arise, but the categorical style of writing means that they will have to 
challenge and compete, rather than co-exist and complement. As Tester (1991:13) points out, 
different factions of the animal rights movement have been ‘refighting the quarrel between 
Tweedledee and Tweedledum’ for a long time. There is a danger, then, that counter discourses 
simply provide alternative hegemonic discourses.    
The main similarity between oppressive discourses and the counter-discourses which oppose 
them, is the tendency to treat both human and other species of animals within socially-constructed  
realities, rather than engaging with the lived reality of the animals themselves. Nonhuman animals 
are considered to be resources, species, subspecies, varieties, subpopulations, objects of abuse, 
moral categories, possessors of rights, or entities whose value lies either in rarity, size, or in their 
ability to mimic human behaviour. But despite providing important opposition to oppressive 
discourses, these counter-discourses do not necessarily encourage an attitude of approaching other 
animals with respect and with a willingness to see the world from their perspective.  
 An implication of the discussion in this article is that, in order to work towards improving 
the relationship between humans and other animals, it is necessary to treat counter-discourses with 
critical awareness. This involves recognising their important contribution to countering oppressive 
discourses, but at the same time supplementing them with discourses which represent nonhuman 
animals from a vantage point of deep empathy - as agents of their own lives, living for their own 
purposes. Bate (2000:ix) searches Romantic English poetry for discourses which attempt to heal 
‘Western man’s alienation from nature’. Within the literature, poetry, and story-telling of the world, 
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may lie similar discourses which, if popularised and combined with counter-discourse, could help 
improve the relationship between humans and other animals. 
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